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Abstract. This paper takes a closer look at three highly interrelated areas of media 
accountability: the “three Cs”. The Cs are defined as follows: 1. corrections policies, 
2. complaints management, and 3. coverage of journalism and media by the media. 
Focusing on the US, the UK, Germany, Switzerland and Italy, we will try to explain the 
extent to which “rational economic” behavior can be found in this specific field of self-
inspection, and how “predictably irrational” (Ariely 2008) media owners, media managers 
and journalists make decisions, and how cultural norms and behavior patterns influence 
media accountability and the processing of „unethical‟ or unprofessional behavior.  
Key words:  the behavioral economics, media accountability, “rational economic” 
behavior, cultural norms and behavior patterns. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, key events have raised the public‟s interest in media accountability and ethics 
in journalism: in the German speaking world, the populist Pegida movement accusing the 
mainstream press of lying (“Lügenpresse”) has attained a lot of public attention, and a 
pamphlet dealing with corruption in journalism turned into a bestseller (Ulfkotte 2014). 
Even more recently, the way the press dealt with the crash of a Germanwings airplane, its 
kamikaze co-pilot and the 149 victims raised a lot of public concern, indicated by 430 
complaints to the national press council. In the Anglosaxon world, earlier and most notably, 
the presentation of the Leveson Report concerning the criminal activities of Murdoch‟s 
News of the World, the BBC‟s maneuvering to veil the pedophilic misconduct of one of 
its most prominent TV moderators raised awareness. All over Europe, the propaganda 
battles stemming from the wars in Ukraine and in the Near East and the rapid spread of 
disinformation across social networks led to additional concerns.  
All these instances have triggered discussion about journalism ethics and media 
accountability, an area in which little economic analysis has been performed. Based on an 
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economic theory of journalism (Fengler and Russ-Mohl 2005; Hamilton 2004; Russ-
Mohl 1994, ch. 4) and its first „extensions‟ into behavioral economics (Russ-Mohl 2009, 
2010, 2015; Fengler and Russ-Mohl 2014), this paper takes a closer look at three highly 
interrelated areas of media accountability: the „three Cs.‟ The Cs are defined as follows: 
1. Corrections policies, 2. Complaints management and 3. Coverage of journalism and media 
by the media. 
Focusing on the US, the UK, Germany, Switzerland and Italy, we will try to explain 
the extent to which „rational economic‟ behavior can be found in this specific field of self-
inspection, and how „predictably irrational‟ (Ariely 2008) media owners, media managers 
and journalists make decisions, and how cultural norms and behavior patterns influence 
media accountability and the processing of „unethical‟ or unprofessional behavior.  
The primary questions are:  
 Why does the media not pay more attention to the three Cs, even though doing so 
would be institutionally beneficial?  
 Why have media accountability institutions worked fairly well in some countries, 
while they are nonexistent or ineffective in others?  
 How does media accountability change under conditions of media convergence? 
More specifically, we would like to discuss whether there are economic explanations 
for the following questions: 
 Why are corrections policies close to nonexistent in Europe while they are well 
established in the US? 
 Why have ombudsmen become comparatively strong and visible in the US (though 
some were abolished during the recent years of crisis), while remaining marginal in 
the UK and Germany and virtually nonexistent in Italy? 
 Why do some countries (like Switzerland) have a comparably strong and visible 
press council as well as (weak and non-visible) ombudsmen (mostly required by 
law), while other countries (like the US) have (visible and strong) ombudsmen 
(without legal requirement), but no national press council, or rely more heavily on a 
national press council than on ombudsmen (Germany)? 
 Why is media journalism neglected by most quality media outlets belonging to 
huge media conglomerates (like Die Welt of Springer AG or The Times and the Wall 
Street Journal of News Corp.), while a handful of more independent newspapers 
(like the New York Times, the Guardian, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung, tageszeitung) dedicate more attention to 
this peculiar but important genre? 
We will proceed to explore the aforementioned issues in several steps. Firstly, we explore 
the argument that investments in media accountability make sense not only from a public 
interest perspective, but also serve the institutional self-interest of media companies, 
particularly those dedicated to products of high journalistic quality addressing educated 
publics. Second, we will discuss how media executives and journalists rationalize 
underinvestment in media accountability. This will be followed by an analysis of how 
underinvestment can be further explained by „predictably irrational‟ behavior, based on 
insights provided by behavioral economics and social psychology. Next, we will discuss how 
these irrational behaviors may be better explained by specific cultural patterns of decision-
making. Lastly, the final portion of the paper will summarize the ways in which media 
accountability continues to change under the conditions of Web 2.0 and media convergence, 
and how the lighthouses of journalistic quality may be affected if they do not change their 
attitudes toward the three Cs.  
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2. MEDIA ACCOUNTABILITY AS A WORTHY INVESTMENT 
From a business (and thus economic) perspective, media executives should invest in 
media accountability. Media accountability is not at all costly – in fact, it is rather cheap. 
 Correction corners require the attention and dedication of a newsroom, but they do 
not cost „real‟ money. 
 Costs for press councils are usually low, as members will work on an honorary 
basis or for low compensation. As costs for supporting press councils are shared 
by many media companies, they are negligible in budgets. 
 Ombudsmen are mediators. In most media outlets an ombudsman will hold a part-
time position, which might even be an honorary, unsalaried role.  
 Media journalists are more expensive, but need not necessarily be added to an 
existing newsroom. Costs for media journalism can be kept low if the section is 
created by shifting resources within the newsroom. If the top editors agree that 
media and journalism are important topics of coverage, they may dedicate existing 
space, reporters and editors to such specialized reporting.  
Media accountability also pays off, in that it promises returns: 
 If ombudsmen and press councils work well, this can be considered an “insurance 
policy” against more costly, time absorbing risks. They are effective mediation 
systems, reducing the costs for legal advice and legal battles. According to Klaus 
Kocks (2013, 95), who provides a more cynical view, a press council is “the 
publisher‟s PR agency tasked with muddying the systemic facts with accidental 
criticism”. If press councils communicate their decisions to the public and to 
newsrooms effectively, and if ombudsmen write regularly as columnists about media 
and journalism, both institutions provide insight into the rationale behind news 
decisions, foster relationships with readers, increase journalism‟s credibility, and 
educate journalists and the public about the media. Thus, they improve media literacy 
and quality consciousness.  
 Ultimately, increased quality consciousness of recipients should also increase their 
willingness to pay for high journalistic quality. 
So why do media companies invest so little in media accountability? 
If we take a second glance, we may have to differentiate and add to the assumption that 
each media system can be divided in a lower and an upper quality segment, concerning the 
journalism being offered. The size and the percentage share of the upper segment will vary 
from country to country, from journalism culture to journalism culture – and in some 
countries there may be a more clear separation of „black‟ and „white‟ market segments (UK, 
Germany), while in other countries „shades of grey‟ will dominate (US, Switzerland and 
Italy).  
If we apply traditional neoclassical economic theory to the problem of media 
accountability, the question of whether media companies will invest in accountability and 
behave ethically can be answered easily: a rational, self-interested choice for increased 
accountability and ethics will be made if it pays off. On the other hand, unethical behavior will 
increase if it significantly reduces the cost of production (potential „premium‟), if the 
probability of getting caught is low, and if the potential sanctions aren‟t terribly drastic (Entorf 
and Spengler 1998, 348). 
Concerning media accountability, there exists a built-in conflict of interest between the 
lower and the upper market segments: 
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 The business success of the upper segment depends more and more on the recipients‟ 
willingness to pay and on increasing the share of recipients interested in credible, 
high quality journalism. In the upper segment, unethical behavior like manipulation, 
copy-and-paste journalism, plagiarism and corruption will likely be detected by 
the recipients, and the damage to the brand and to the newsroom will be more 
hazardous than in the lower segment. 
 The lower segment will serve audiences with lower levels of education and media 
literacy, and possibly a higher interest in entertainment than in-depth news. It will 
be more advertiser-driven and less dependent on generating revenues from recipients. 
In this segment there is a reduced institutional interest for media companies and 
newsrooms to increase credibility, the audiences‟ media literacy and their own media 
accountability. 
Thus, we may have to modify the initial statement: if media executives in the upper 
quality segment were rational, self-interested actors primarily concerned about the economic 
wellbeing of the media institutions and newsrooms they are responsible for, they would invest 
considerably more in media accountability than they have done so far. Accountability is in the 
rational institutional self-interest of such media companies. They need to protect the integrity 
of their brands and the credibility of the newsrooms. In the lower segment, the premium for 
non-compliance with media accountability and ethical behavior is higher, and the likelihood 
of getting caught and punished for noncompliance is considerably lower. 
Still, the question persists regarding why such investments remain rare in the upper 
segment as well. There are four “rational” answers which may help solve the puzzle: 
1. Aside from the conflict of interest between the upper and lower quality segments of 
the media, there is a second and potentially more intriguing conflict between the institutional 
and the personal self-interests of media owners, media managers and top editors. Media 
executives are certainly aware of what they are doing to others when they scandalize 
politicians, CEOs and other members of the celebrities‟ club (Kepplinger 2012; Pörksen 
and Detel 2012) – and they simply may not want to become victims of the same tortures. 
2. The relationship between media executives and press councils or ombudsmen can 
also be seen as a principal-agent relationship, where information asymmetries occur (Fengler 
and Russ-Mohl 2005, 137; Russ-Mohl 2009, 115). As „principals,‟ media executives may 
mistrust whether ombudsmen, press councils or media journalists serving the industry as 
„agents‟ might abuse their positions, power and knowledge. For example, two of the New 
York Times‟s ombudsmen – Daniel Okrent and Bryan Calame – became obsessed with 
fighting the then editor in chief Bill Keller (Bandler 2004; Calame 2006: Elia 2007, 63), 
and by doing so, they endangered the very institution of the Public Editor. 
3. Media companies may also find themselves in a prisoner‟s dilemma (Fengler and 
Russ-Mohl 2005, 52; Russ-Mohl 2009, 117). If they remain the only ones implementing 
the three Cs because competitors do not follow, they risk compromising themselves. The 
costs will be due immediately, while the benefits of the more costly accountability policies 
(ombudsmen, media journalists) will only materialize if they are shared among the media 
operating in the upper market segment. 
4. Most media in the upper segment operate within huge media conglomerates. Some 
of them may even be flagships of their companies (e.g., USA Today of Gannett, Die Welt 
of Springer AG, and Tages-Anzeiger of Tamedia). In many cases, the cash cows of these 
companies are in the lower segment, perhaps even subsidizing the flagships. Under such 
conditions, it becomes difficult for the flagships to „independently‟ support policies of 
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media accountability. The overarching institutional interests of the conglomerate will 
outweigh the institutional interests of the media in the upper market segment. 
Hence, the self-serving interests of top decision-makers in media companies will win 
over the institutional interests of media companies (this is not uncommon, given the 
endless discussions about disproportionate salaries and bonuses of top managers). The 
institutional interests of the mother companies will have a stronger effect on media 
accountability policies than the institutional interests of their „upper class‟ subsidiaries. 
These are plausible arguments, yet they do not completely explain the underinvestment in 
media accountability. 
3. RATIONALIZING THE STATUS QUO AND INDECISIVENESS 
People are not always rational decision makers, but they tend to rationalize their 
decisions (Aronson 1968, 6; Schönbach 2009). Similarly, media executives rationalize 
their indecisiveness and disengagement in the field of media accountability.  
They usually do so by declaring that audiences are neither interested in media 
accountability nor media journalism (Kreitling 1996; Russ-Mohl and Fengler 2000; Fengler 
2002). They also state without further proof that press councils, ombudsmen, and media 
journalists may have negative effects on journalistic credibility. They may even go so far as 
to counterattack institutions like press councils, claiming they are superfluous and endanger 
press freedom (Isaacs 1986, referring to The New York Times; Russ-Mohl 1994, 165), that 
they impede journalistic investigation (Twickel 2012), or by mobilizing, like most recently 
the German Bild-Zeitung, readers against the press council‟s verdict. Even research results 
that provide proof of the opposite (Russ-Mohl 1994; Urban 1999; Fög 2010 and 2011) 
came under attack: according to some publishers, they were irrelevant and should be 
ignored (Supino 2010; Lebrument 2011 and 2012; Staun 2012). Two populist papers in 
Austria – Kronen-Zeitung and Österreich – filed lawsuits against the press council. 
4. BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
By rationalizing indecisiveness and underinvestment, media executives may become 
victims of selective perception and cognitive dissonance (Aronson 1968; Kahneman and 
Tversky 2000; for recent summaries: Dobelli 2011 and 2012) – though the following 
paragraphs are somewhat speculative and are certainly in need of further empirical proof. 
Abolishing media sections and specialized media journalists from newsrooms (as 
occurred at the Tages-Anzeiger in Switzerland, Die Zeit in Germany and Il Sole-24 ore in 
Italy) can be attributed to the self-conscious preoccupations of media executives who fear 
negative coverage and scandalization. The actual danger of such actions is overrated and 
such anxieties are likely based on neglect of probability (Tversky and Fox 2000). If you 
are not Rupert Murdoch yourself, it is highly improbable that you will be scandalized by 
competing newsrooms. Yet there are well known examples of „successful‟ attempts (e.g. Axel 
Springer was scandalized in the late 1960s by Spiegel and most left-leaning mainstream 
media outlets in Germany, and later Hubert Burda and Leo Kirch by the Springer press) 
which probably created „anchors‟ (Tversky/Kahnemann 1992) for media owners, media 
managers, or top-editors. This bred expectations that in the future something similar might 
happen to them, based on the selective perceptions of the past. 
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Zero cost craze is another trap in which media executives may fall prey. If one does 
not invest in media accountability, this seemingly implies „zero cost‟ – and as Ariely (2008) 
has pointed out, all of us tend to behave irrationally if we can get hold of a „freebie‟. 
However, the enjoyment of freebies rarely works in the long run, as hidden costs accompany 
them. The enthusiasm for zero cost is paired with media managers and journalists‟ ignorance 
that they must frequently work against the dynamics of markets for lemons (Akerlof 1970). 
In such markets, buyers are either unaware of quality differences of products or services or 
unable to judge them. Sellers who want to continue to provide high quality products need to 
develop specific strategies to communicate the quality of their offerings in order to justify 
the higher price. Some educational efforts may be necessary to increase recipients‟ willingness 
to pay for journalism. Besides media education in schools, mainly serious media journalism 
can provide the credible platforms which are needed for such discourse. However, those 
willing to make the first move may be caught in the prisoner‟s dilemma, as they cannot 
cover themselves with credibility. The „platform system‟ will only create benefits for 
media in the upper market segment if there are several media outlets who participate and 
observe one another, hence meeting the professional standards of un-biased reporting. 
If top editors resist the institutionalization of ombudsmen, they will also likely become 
victims of the overconfidence effect (Vallone 1990; Dobelli 2011, 13), the control illusion 
(Langer 1975; Dobelli 2011, 65) and of loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky 
and Kahneman 2000). 
The overconfidence and control illusion effects mean that editors are unaware of their 
own limits in handling errors and conflicts adequately and with a certain „distance‟. They 
underestimate the time needed for mediating and problem solving in cases of conflict about 
media coverage, but also in coaching their own staff.  
The concept of loss aversion has so far been primarily applied to physical properties, 
but it can also be adapted to the loss of power. Introducing an ombudsman and accepting 
a press council means some sharing of responsibility in defining ethical standards for top 
decision makers in the media. Thus, such individuals may stand to lose some of their own 
power, which may be (irrationally) perceived as more risky and costly than the opportunity to 
gain additional credibility, reputation and status by iterative cooperation with accountability 
institutions. 
Another factor impeding innovation in the field of media accountability is the endowment 
effect (Kahneman et al. 1991 and 2000; Ariely 2008, 127). This concept can be also applied to 
explain the underinvestment in media accountability. We tend to overvalue not only our 
estates and possessions, but also existing procedures and routines which have become a kind 
of „social capital‟ and are therefore difficult to change or abolish (Downs 1967, 158). As long 
as the public refrains from actively demanding more accountability and transparency, media 
executives and journalists will continue their routine of neglecting to provide it. 
A form of irrational behavior most media actors are quite aware of is reciprocity 
(Trivers 1971), and thus the fear of revenge. This is one more reason why the three Cs and 
media journalism in particular remain low key. In the event that a media executive or media 
company is publically scandalized by other media outlets, those reporting the scandal remain 
aware that the next opportunity for revenge is always just around the corner. 
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5. CULTURAL DIFFERENCES 
The significant cultural differences existing even among highly developed Western 
countries are deeply rooted in history. Traditions, norms, and religious beliefs should not be 
underestimated and may shape rational and irrational behavior considerably. Since the heroic 
efforts of Hallin and Mancini (2004) to distinguish „liberal-market oriented‟ from „polarized-
pluralist‟ and „corporatist-democratic‟ media cultures in Western Europe, additional research 
to grasp such differences among media systems and to create typologies has been conducted 
and this has resulted in more sophisticated schemes and analyses (Blum 2005 and 2014; 
Wessler 2010; Hallin and Mancini 2011; Esser and Hanitzsch 2012; Fengler et al. 2014).  
Once more, in explaining such differences in „media accountability cultures,‟ behavioral 
economics and social psychology provide useful insights: Herd behavior in journalism and 
in the media industries (Fengler and Russ-Mohl 2005, 166; Cipriani and Guarino 2008, 2; 
Russ-Mohl 2009, 120; Stiglitz 2011) creates a strong momentum when newsrooms become 
engaged in scandalization (Lloyd 2011; Kepplinger 2012; Pörksen and Detel 2012), as well 
as when they must make decisions about their own futures. For example, the combination 
of poorly institutionalized press councils, strongly institutionalized ombudsmen and the 
appearance of corrections columns in the US may be explained in part by the New York 
Times‟ leadership role. The newspaper opposed a national press council (Isaacs 1986), was 
early to introduce a Public Editor (i.e. ombudsman), and dedicated a great deal of attention 
to its corrections columns and correction policies. Many other news media have since 
followed both its bad and good examples. 
Similarly, media executives in countries with negligible media accountability activity 
(like Italy) may have become victims of groupthink (Janis 1972), of social proof (Cialdini 
2001; Dobelli 2011, 17) – and, again, of herd behavior. There, however, the lack of the 
three Cs must be seen in a larger context. It is unrealistic to expect media accountability 
infrastructures to flourish in a country where the legal system is compromised, where 
mafia-like activities surpass the government and penetrate the economic system, where you 
find little appreciation for the public interest, and even less conscientiousness for public 
space (Falk 2003, 162). 
6. OUTLOOK AND SUMMARY 
So, what is next? Under the conditions of media convergence, with a wide array of 
blogs and social media flaunting increased interactivity and linking options, traditional 
mainstream media have lost their monopoly over gatekeeping, news distribution and agenda 
setting. They are also rapidly losing control over media accountability processes and 
procedures (Eberwein 2010; Fengler et al. 2013, 213-230).  
6.1. Perspectives for media practitioners and newsrooms 
In the blogosphere, social networks and interactive Web 2.0 environment, new forms 
of „crowdsourced media accountability‟ (Fengler 2012) are developing. If media executives 
working in high quality media do not change their policies towards the „three Cs,‟ making 
their activities more transparent, this behavior may further contribute to the decline of high 
quality journalism.  
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Given the cultural differences between the journalism cultures mentioned here and the 
speed with which the Web 2.0 environment changes, it is impossible to forecast whether 
this will be a slow erosion or an expeditious process, as the recent “Lügenpresse” (=lying 
media) chorus of the Pegida movement in Germany might suggest. The result depends not 
only on media executives‟ decisions, but also on the decisions of the media users. Is their 
media literacy increasing or decreasing? Will they demand more media accountability by 
using their „voice option‟ or will they rather take the „exit option‟ (Hirschman 1970) and 
disappear as recipients of media that does not meet their expectations of being accountable, 
transparent, and credible? Without an increasing demand for media accountability from the 
recipients, media executives may continue to deal with the issue using something they may 
conceive as „rational ignorance‟ (Downs 1957) – though our analysis has provided strong 
arguments positing that this kind of ignorance is rather irrational and may bear high costs 
for those newsrooms hoping to survive in the upper segment of the media market.  
6.2. Perspectives for further research 
This contribution has discussed the economics and cultural prerequisites of 
institutionalizing ombudsmen and press councils, questioning economic rationales and 
looking for cultural patterns which are favorable when nourishing such institutions in a 
cross cultural comparison. 
When possible, we referred to behavioral economics, as this field of research holds 
particularly rich insights which may help bridge the gap between assumptions of 
economically rational, self-interested behavior and empirically observable, more complex 
behavior, which will always be culturally shaped.  
However, it should also be seen that this approach itself may have its limits: As 
Emanuel Derman has pointed out, researchers have used behavioral economics „as a smoke 
screen to write all kind of papers on pretended irrationalities,‟ adding that „in particular, 
those approaches to behavioral economics have flourished which are insinuating that human 
beings are mentally deficient in estimating probabilities and should therefore be guided by 
governments with the support of researchers to do what is “good” for them‟ (Derman 
2012). Either way, a soft approach of paternalistic liberalism (Sunstein and Thaler 2003; 
Thaler and Sunstein 2009) and co-regulation (Donges 2007) may be highly preferable over 
direct government enforcement - particularly in the field of media accountability, where 
stronger governmental intervention will always result in some form of censorship. 
There is no doubt that journalism ethics are based on individual behavior as well as on 
norms set by institutions (Rühl and Saxer 1981). However, individual and institutional 
behaviors are also shaped by economic factors and cultural patterns. With more systematic 
reviews of the insights yielded from work in behavioral economics, we hope to provide 
fresh perspectives on economic incentives in addition to specific construction plans for 
empowering media accountability institutions. Such institutions might manage unethical 
decision-making more effectively. However, underlying irrationalities of decision makers 
and cultural patterns could continue to impede progress. 
To put this research into a broader context: prejudices and other shortsightedness still 
slows the interdisciplinary cooperation between media researchers and economists (Russ-
Mohl 2012). During the last decades, an increasing number of economists have begun to 
analyze – in close cooperation with psychologists, social psychologists, and neuroscientists – 
the conditions under which human behavior turns to „predictable irrationalities,‟ and why 
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there are such deviations from the „homo economicus model.‟ Their insights are not only 
revolutionizing economics. If applied more systematically, they might have a similar 
impact on media and journalism research – stimulating more plausible research hypotheses as 
well as empirical research and experiments.  
There are three foreseeable „lines of attack‟ for further research:  
1. In the area of media accountability the analysis might be deepened: aside from the 
examples mentioned above, there are more typical fallacies of decision making which 
lead to irrational behavior and which need to be analyzed in more detail (for an overview: 
Dobelli 2011 and 2012). 
2. As shown in our case study on media accountability, existing insights and research 
results from behavioral economics might also be used to better understand the decision-
making processes in other areas of journalism and media. Some examples that could be 
analyzed more thoroughly include the relationship between PR experts and journalists, or 
between media management and newsrooms. For example, it could be taken into account 
how herd behavior influences the pricing of media products („paywalls‟), or how irrationalities 
on the side of students, journalism school administrations, university and government 
bureaucracies, and employers in the media industry create the existing mismatch of supply 
and demand in journalism education and in the journalistic labor market. In all these cases, 
behavioral economics could help to generate plausible research hypotheses as well as 
explanations to better understand current realities, observable behaviors and undesirable 
developments. Researchers need to systematically discover the circumstances under which 
media actors behave „predictably irrational‟ (Ariely 2008) and become, for example, victims 
of groupthink (Janis 1972) or heard behavior (Cipriani and Guarino 2008; Stiglitz 2011; 
Fürst 2013; Iha 2013). 
3. In the area of media accountability, as well as in other fields of media research, 
specific experiments aimed at journalists, media managers, and other media actors need to 
be developed to empirically test whether and how the existing results of behavioral 
economics can be applied to these professional groups. Many of the existing results are 
based on experiments with American business students and may not be transferable in other 
cultural and professional contexts.  
Understanding in more detail how top editors, media managers and other media actors 
make decisions and what kind of errors they commit should help provide a more realistic 
evaluation of what kind of normative expectations, incentives, and regulations might be 
accepted by media practitioners and media users – and which ones will not.  
In particular, one relevant question remains: how much should media users be 
patronized by governments with compulsory levies meant to ensure journalism quality? In 
recent years, a surprising number of scholars and journalists (e.g. Chesney and Pickard 
2011; Downie and Schudson 2009; Habermas 2007; Kiefer 2011) have argued in this 
direction. One might suspect that even in this area, herd behavior is at work – which seems 
to play an important role not only in journalism but in research as well, though thus far it 
has not been well researched (for an early attempt: Kuhn 1967). The risks and side effects 
of such proposals have not been evaluated adequately (Russ-Mohl 2011), and the principle of 
proportionality has not been applied to the case to find out whether the same desirable effect 
might possibly be achieved without forcing citizens to pay more royalties, for example by 
improving the choice architecture (Sunstein and Thaler 2003; Thaler and Sunstein 2009). 
Here, another promising field of interdisciplinary research has opened for journalism 
researchers and behavioral economists: can socially desirable media consumption be „nudged‟ 
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- instead of subsidizing media offers which are not in sufficient demand? Might changes 
in the choice architecture help to reduce the bureaucratic ossification of mammoth public 
broadcasting bureaucracies, instead of letting them grow further by intransparent public 
alimentation? Could current price competition in media markets be reversed to quality 
competition? In present media markets - which are frequently „markets for lemons‟ – 
advertising and royalty-driven media offers clearly mitigate quality offers that are directly 
financed by audiences. If these audiences were informed citizens - if they were more 
knowledgeable and more quality conscious - they might decide to spend less money on 
advertised consumer goods and services (Enzensberger 2013) and much more on high quality 
journalism. Obviously, there is more joint research work to be done by behavioral economists 
and journalism researchers. Let‟s tackle the challenges! 
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BIHEJVIORALNA EKONOMIJA I ODGOVORNOST MEDIJA 
Rad nudi bliži pogled na tri snažno povezane oblasti odgovornosti medija. Oblasti smo definisali na 
sledeći način: 1. politika ispravke, 2. proces postupanja po primljenim žalbama i 3. pokrivenost 
novinarstva i medija od strane medija. Fokusom na Sjedinjene Američke Države, Veliku Britaniju, 
Nemačku, Švajcarsku i Italiju, pokušaćemo da objasnimo u kojoj meri se “racionalno ekonomsko” 
ponašanje može pozicionirati u oblasti samo-ispitivanja i kako “predvidivo iracionalni” (Arieli 2008) 
vlasnici medija, medijski menadžeri i novinari donose odluke, te kako kulturne norme i obrasci 
ponašanja utiču na odgovornost medija i procesuiranja “nemoralnog” ili neprofesionalnog ponašanja.  
Ključne reči: bihejvioralna ekonomija, odgovornost medija, “racionalno ekonomsko” ponašanje, 
kulturne norme i obrasci ponašanja.  
 
